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The aim of this dissertation is to assess how changing tax regulation may affect the capital 
structure of firms, in particular, how the introduction of a new tax provision – the Notional 
Interest Deduction (NID) – impacted firms’ financing decisions in Italy. To perform this 
study, we gathered company data from 2005 to 2015 and we analysed a sample of 197 Italian 
public firms, separating them into two distinct groups: (i) Financial companies and (ii) Non-
financial companies. While for Financial companies it seems that the NID implementation did 
not translate itself into statistically significant effects, results show that for Non-financial 
companies there is a slightly increase of 2% in leverage ratios, that is softened for more 
profitable firms. Results seem to be robust when changing the form of treatment regarding 
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O objectivo desta tese é avaliar como alterações no regulamento fiscal podem afectar a 
estrutura de capital de empresas, em particular, como a introdução de uma nova provisão 
fiscal – o Notional Interest Deduction (NID) – impactou as decisões de financiamento das 
empresas em Itália. Para realizar este estudo, reunimos dados empresariais de 2005 até 2015 e 
analisámos uma amostra de 197 empresas públicas italianas, separando-as em dois grupos 
distintos: (i) empresas Financeiras e (ii) empresas Não-Financeiras. Enquanto para as 
empresas Financeiras o NID não aparenta reflectir-se em resultados estatisticamente 
significativos, os resultados demonstram que para as empresas Não-Financeiras há um 
pequeno aumento de 2% nos rácios de alavancagem, que é atenuado para empresas de maior 
rentabilidade. Os resultados evidenciam ser robustos quando alteramos o modo de tratamento 
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I – Introduction 
 
 Throughout the years, one of the main research topics in Empirical Finance has been 
the decision regarding a firm’s optimal capital structure and the factors that condition this 
decision.  Identifying the sources of capital structure variation and their practical relationship 
with the predominant theories that aim to provide an explanation for capital structure –trade-
off and pecking order- is currently a source of motivation for many researchers (Graham, and 
Leary 2011).  Within the trade-off theory there is, without a doubt, an agreed consensus 
regarding the tax advantages of debt and its positive contribute to firm value up to a certain 
level (Korteweg 2009).  However, this optimal level of debt is still under great debate: some 
authors tend to view it as a trade-off between the benefits of debt and the negative incentives 
generated with suppliers (Hennessy, and Livdan 2009), but the general consensus seems to be 
that there is a cap to these positive effects of contracting debt.  
With this in mind, and with the excess debt and consequent negative effects observed 
in firms during the 2008 financial crisis, the study of dual tax regimes and the implementation 
of tax policies that provide a fiscal incentive to equity increases has been incentivized (IMF, 
2009).  Trying to find a viable tax policy that not only provides firms with the established 
benefits of contracting debt but that also enables these fiscal incentives to financing through 
equity is, according to De Mooij (2011) and the IMF, a key aspect that could have many 
benefits. 
This dissertation in mainly focused in analysing a concrete tax incentive -the Notional 
Interest Deduction (NID) – in order to verify whether this much needed recapitalization can 
be prompted in response to a more “equity-favourable” tax policy. The impacts of the 
introduction of the NID will be assessed through the analysis of the Italian case, where the 
NID was introduced in 2011. Italian firms are, according to both the European Commission 
(2008) and the IMF (2009) some of the more leveraged firms among European firms, making 
them highly exposed to default risk.  
This high leverage seems alarming, especially when related to the high number of 
NPL’s (Non-performing Loans) that is observed in Italy (see Appendix 1). It is evidenced that 
besides high leverage ratios, there is also a great potential for a part of this leverage to end up 
in a default situation on their respective loans. This problem still subsists as the high level of 
NPL’s remains as one of the major concerns regarding Italian bank’s balance sheets (IMF 
Country Report No. 16/222, July 2016).  
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Throughout this paper we will try to verify the existence of, and quantify the changes 
in the capital structure of Italian firms, resulting from the introduction of the NID in Italy. 
This study will also try to assess the source of those changes and its theoretical impact in the 
default risk of Italian firms.  
 
I.1) Notional Interest Deduction (NID) 
 The NID, also referred to in Italy as ACE - “Aiuto alla Crescita Economica”, meaning 
Aid to Economic Growth, is a tax incentive to firms’ equity funding. It is commonly referred 
to by its English concept: ACE – Allowance for Corporate Equity, and it was introduced in 
Italy in 2011 (Italian Law Decree, 06 December 2011, n. 201). It is a tax incentive for firms to 
increase its capital and a possible solution for the existing debt bias when it comes to deciding 
amongst sources of funding. 
 While under most tax systems only interest expenses seem to be deductible, the NID 
tries to eliminate this bias: the NID implements a benefit for firms, which is calculated as a 
percentage of annual positive variations in equity. That percentage is defined as the 
imputation rate. Further detail regarding this concept and its application in Italy will be given 
in Section II. 
 
I.2) Hypotheses/ Research Questions   
 Most of the existing literature relating tax policies and capital structures is done to 
assess the tax advantages of debt. As evidenced in the Literature Review section, there are 
also some studies that try to assess the impact of alternative tax regimes based on the idea of 
equity subsidies. However, those studies are either focused on similar, but nonetheless 
different tax regimes – like Dual Tax systems -, or focused in analysing the impact of the NID 
in other countries, as in the Belgian case (which also incorporates some differences when 
compared to the Italian NID).  
In terms of similar studies on Dual Income Tax systems, we can highlight the study 
performed by Sørensen (2009) that was focused on Nordic countries and that will be 
mentioned throughout Section II – among others-. Also in Section II we will refer studies 
regarding the other applications of the NID itself that were conducted mainly for the Belgian 
case (see Zangari, 2014 and Panier et al., 2015), which included several differences mostly 
regarding the application base (non-incremental for the Belgian case) and specific anti-
avoidance rules (which seem to be “tighter” for the Italian case). 
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 This way, this thesis will focus on trying to answer two specific research questions: 
the first question is mainly focused at addressing the existing bias towards the fiscal benefits 
of debt and verifying if changing that bias materializes in a real impact among firms’ capital 
structures, by analysing the Italian case of the NID application. 
 
Research Question 1: Do changes in tax policies affect capital structure decisions? 
 
 The second question is more focused on assessing if this possible impact of changing 
tax regimes - that will be assessed by the first research question - is positive, or negative. By 
positive we mean that the impact generated will lead to a reduction in the leverage ratio of the 
analysed firms, whereas negative will increase that same ratio. When we use the term positive 
for lower leverage ratios we imply two distinct meanings: (1) if we are putting in practice a 
tax regime that aims at implementing higher capitalization among firms, it is only natural that 
we consider it as positive if it accomplishes the objective for which it was designed; and (2) 
if, as described before, we consider that the high level of debt among Italian firms is not only 
a considerable source of credit risk for those firms, but also a potential threat for the overall 
economic stability of the country (and even for the European Union) , then one must find the 
qualitative use of the word positive to describe a scenario in which that problem is being 
solved. 
 Therefore, the second research question can be defined as: 
 
Research Question 2: Does the implementation of NID lead lower leverage ratios? 
 
 Considering the motivation for this study, we expect that the answer to both these 
questions is affirmative, and further detail regarding the methodology that was implemented 
in practice and the results obtained will be explained in consequent sections. 
 
I.3) Contribution of present dissertation 
 Besides the personal motivation for the present Master Thesis, the aim of this 
dissertation was directed at two distinct areas of possible contribution: the first one concerns 
the existing financial literature regarding tax regimes that try to put an end to the fiscal bias of 
the benefits of debt. As mentioned before, and throughout the next section - Literature Review 
– there seems to be, to our best knowledge, a reduced amount of studies focused on assessing 
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how a tax regime that subsidizes equity can impact the capital structure of firms. Even though 
there are some studies in this area, it seems that (i) they could be further developed and (ii) 
they could be applied to other specific countries and samples of data for which this impact 
was not studied. Therefore, we decided to perform this analysis for the Italian case, which 
seemed to be value-adding: we will study the impact of the NID, including in our sample a 
period of 4 to 5 years before the NID implementation, and the same number of years after. To 
the best of our knowledge, this has not been done before and will allow us to have a more 
realistic measure of the impacts of the introduction of this tax policy, since we are basing 
ourselves on a significant amount of data posterior to the introduction of this specific effect. 
This effect will be studied also incorporating other firm-specific factors that influence firms’ 
capital structure, and that will be explained throughout the paper. 
 The second area of contribution is related to the financial crisis of 2008: this 
dissertation can perhaps help materialize the belief that a reduction of firm’s leverage, in this 
case in Italy, can lead to “healthier” capital structures, with lower default risk, without 
compromising financial results. As mentioned before, the IMF as voiced their concern 
regarding the high levels of debt and the excessive credit risk of Italian firms, and if we can 
show that a tax regime like the NID can indeed reduce the debt ratios of Italian firms, it could 
be a good starting point to try and implement the same regime in other European countries 
which have never experienced such policies. This would show that an optimal tax policy can 
shape the economic reality of business financing, leading to more capitalized and self-
sustained companies, that will not create such an over-demand for credit and that will 
eventually take pressure off financial institutions ratios.  
 
 In short, this Master Thesis will be organized on the following order: in Section II we 
will present existing literature related to the topic we are analysing. Section III will focus on 
the sample and methodology used, while also describing and justifying the other firm-specific 
factors we used to explain Italian firms’ capital structure. Section IV will present the results 
we got with our study, and sections V and VI will respectively refer the main conclusions and 






II – Literature Review 
 
 In this section we will focus on existing papers and researches that can help achieve an 
objective and supported view of what is currently perceived regarding some concepts that are, 
without a doubt, intertwined with the objective of this dissertation. In order to fully 
comprehend the possible effect of changing tax policies in capital structure, one should first 
be acquainted with recent empirical finance researches regarding both capital structure and 
dual tax regimes that have been put in practice before, and that allow for a more realistic 
approach to tackle this problem. 
 
II.1) Capital Structure 
Since the ground-breaking research conducted by Modigliani and Miller (1958), the 
great focus in empirical finance studies has been the analysis and testing of the two 
mainstream theories regarding capital structure: the trade-off and the pecking order models. 
The trade-off model proposes that firms should be able to manage the benefits and the costs of 
contracting debt, and balance them to an optimum level where that relationship is maximized 
(Kraus, and Litzenberger 1973).  
On the other hand, according to Myers and Majluf (1984), the pecking order theory 
establishes an order or hierarchy for firms’ financing that is established on the basis of 
avoiding asymmetry of information problems. Since managers know more about the firm than 
outside stakeholders, the way firms are financed should be decided as to minimize the costs of 
security issuance (Myers, and Majluf 1984). Along this line of thought, when raising funds, 
priority should be given to internal funds, followed by external debt and lastly, by the 
issuance of new equity (Kraus, and Litzenberger 1973). When a firm is not able to fund itself 
internally, it should opt for debt, contracting it up to the theoretical optimum as established by 
the trade-off theory.  
According to Graham, and Leary (2011) both these theories have been successful in 
explaining some of the factors that condition capital structures. However, Graham and Leary 
(2011) also state that both theories have failed in fully explaining the capitalization of firms. 
This failure to explain much of the variation in companies’ debt policies can, according to 
these authors, be explained by several factors that include variables mis-measurements and 
other effects such as the ones generated by supply and non-financial stakeholders (among 
others). 
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In addition, both these theories also fail to incorporate the effect of tax regimes that 
subsidize equity, maybe because this kind of taxation has not been widely adopted around the 
world. However, recent studies have started to question the bias related to the tax advantages 
of debt over equity, and raised significant doubts regarding the principals for this bias, since it 
seems evident that a firm’s leverage and riskiness would decrease if interest expenses were 
not tax deductible (Karpavičius et al, 2016).  
Panier et al. (2015) conducted a study to assess the impact of taxes in the capital 
structure of Belgian firms, by analysing the effects of the implementation of the NID in 
Belgium. Based on their sample, they concluded that having a tax policy that subsidizes 
equity indeed increases the capitalization of firms. This was verified for both new and 
existing firms, but with a higher effect for new and large firms. It is also shown that the lower 
levels of leverage observed after the NID implementation in Belgium were in fact generated 
by higher levels of equity and not by reducing previous level of debt. This indeed proves that, 
under the NID, Belgian firms found the characteristics of equity financing to be more 
advantageous than the ones of debt financing. 
 
II.2) Dual Tax Systems 
 The first fiscal policy that addressed the pending issue regarding the tax 
inconsistencies in the treatment of equity and debt sources of funding was the Dual Income 
Tax (DIT).  This system was initially implemented in Europe, around 1990, in four Nordic 
countries. Later in that decade it started being adopted in other countries like Italy, Croatia, 
Austria and Belgium (Genser, 2006). 
 Early in the 21st century, the EU regarded the implementation of these dual tax 
systems as most important and believed it should be implemented widely across Europe 
(Cnossen, 2004).  
 Georg von Schanz, a German scholar, introduced the first notions of dual tax systems 
in the beginning of the 19th century. Later, around 1920-1930, Robert Haig and Henry 
Simmons contributed to the development of such ideas, which led to the naming of SHS 
(Schanz/Haig/Simmons) income. 
 According to SHS income tax definition, income should be separated into two 
different components:  annual consumption and increases in asset value, which lead to a 
change in Net Worth (I = C + Δ NW). In the SHS system, "Personal income may be defined 
as "the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the 
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change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the 
period in question." (Simons, 1938) 
This was the first tax system to actively include two different components in its 
calculation. It was on this basis of distinct components for tax calculations that the first dual 
income tax systems started being developed.   
 Dual income taxes seem to be based on the same underlying logic, but present some 
differences:  income is separated as either ordinary or above-normal income. Sørensen (2009) 
refers that DIT “…is a particular form of schedular income tax which combines progressive 
taxation of labor and transfer income with a low flat tax on all capital income”. Sørensen 
(2009) adds that a wide base for the capital income tax is necessary in order to ensure tax 
neutrality. 
 
II.2.1) Italy’s Dual Income Tax 
The Italian dual income tax was put in place from 1998 to 2003. Panteghini, Parisi, 
and Pighetti (2012) state that, as we have seen before, this tax system was applied on the basis 
of recognizing two separate components: ordinary and above-normal income. In the Italian 
case the ordinary income was taxed at a lower rate.  
Also according to Panteghini, Parisi, and Pighetti (2012), the Government reform for a 
dual tax income applied the DIT benefit to new subscriptions and earnings retained after 
1998. This benefit would initially be null and eventually grow as companies became more 
capitalized. 
However, after the 2001 Italian elections, which lead to a change in government, it 
was observed that a shift in policies towards the DIT was at hand:  the Italian Government 
stopped yielding any benefits to equity increases posterior to June 30th, 2001 and it also 
reduced the imputation rate by half. (Panteghini, 2012) 
To assess the impact of the DIT, Bernasconi (2005) revealed in his studies that 
leverage ratios were reduced while the DIT had been in place. Based on his conclusions, 
Bernasconi actively asked that the elimination of these fiscal policies would be revised.  
 
II.2.2) The Italian notional interest deduction (NID) – or ACE-  
In 2011 the Italian Government decided to again take a step in the direction of dual tax 
systems, and it introduced the notional interest deduction (NID). This dissertation aims at 
studying the effects this particular incentive: even though it is similar to the DIT system that 
was put in practice in the past, under the NID, ordinary income is exempt.  
 14 
According to Law Decree, 22 December 2011, n. 214 and  
Decree by the Ministry of Economy and Finance dated 14 March 2012 the NID only applies 
to changes in the level of capital.  Positive elements will be capital increases like cash 
contributions or allocation of profits to reserves, whereas negative elements will result from 
equity decreases (e.g. distributing retained earnings). 
In 2010, Griffith R., Hines J. and P.B. Sørensen recommended that the NID would be 
calculated on an incremental basis. This suggests that the NID would have to only benefit 
new wealth, meaning changes in the level of capital posterior to the enforcement of this tax 
policy, and not on previous wealth. Recent taxation papers from the European Commission 
(Ernesto Zangari, 2014) seem to provide consistency to Griffith (2010); even though there are 
cases of non-incremental NID application (e.g. Belgium), these papers seem to point out the 
Italian example as more able to fight tax planning, not only due to its incremental base, but by 
combining it with strict anti-avoidance rules. These rules aim at optimizing the NID by 
ensuring not only that “old equity” isn’t converted into “new equity” but also by focusing on 















III – Data and Methodology 
 
 In this section we will start by describing the data used, therefore presenting the 
sample that was gathered for the purpose of this thesis. Consequently, we will evidence the 
methodology that was put in place in order to assess the possible impact of the introduction of 
the NID in Italy: this will involve the description of the regression used, as well as the 
explanation for the both the dependent and independent variables incorporated in the model.  
 
III.1) Sample 
 For the purpose of this study, data was gathered for 197 Italian public firms, starting 
from the end of 2005, up to the end of 2015 (11 years). The source of this data was 
Thomson’s Datastream add-in, which enabled us to access the Worldscope database, directly 
through Microsoft Excel. In this database, there is information for publicly traded firms only 
(which somehow limited our analysis due to the fact that we initially also wanted to include 
private firms, and later realised we could not). All the firms included in our sample are 
therefore traded in the Milan Stock Exchange, and the currency involved is, consequently, the 
Euro.  
To avoid the bias of just including firm that are still active nowadays, our criteria was 
to include every firm that was active in 2005: this means that for some firms, we might not 
get values (up to the end of 2015) for every variable retrieved, since they might have gone 
bankrupt. However, this represents a small amount of the total firms studied (only 6 out of the 
169 Non-Financials firms went bankrupt), and we decided to keep those firms in our sample 
to avoid the bias of only comprising firms that “survived” the analysed time-span in our 
sample. 
For the purpose of this study, we decided to separate the 197 firms in our sample into 
two groups. The criteria for each group were based on the operating industry of each firm (as 
labelled on the Worldscope database). The first group is constituted by “financial” companies 
and therefore it incorporates firms that fit in one of the four following industries: (i) Banks (ii) 
Equity Investment Instruments (iii) Financial Services and (iv) Non-Equity Investment 
Instruments. This group includes a total of 28 firms. We will refer to this group as the 
Financials Group. 
The second group includes all the remaining firms, that seem to be linked to a 
different business reality, defined by being a part of wide set of industries (from the 
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manufacturing, to the aerospace or retail industry – among others –) that are considered as 
non-financial. This group comprises a bigger number of firms, accounting for a total of 169 
firms. Throughout this study, we will refer to this group and the Non-Financials group.  
The reason for separating this sample into these two groups is that Financial and Non-
Financial firms seem to have very different capital structures and different determinants of 
leverage. 
 In total, for each of these 197 firms, we retrieved 7 different variables (for the 
previously mentioned period of 2005-2015), consequently generating panel data. These 
variables are (i) Total Assets, (ii) Total Debt, (iii) Other Tangible Assets, (iv) PPE – Power, 
Plant and Equipment, (v) Net Sales or Revenues, (vi) EBIT – Earnings before Interest and 
Taxes and (vii) Total Interest on Debt. We will explain the literary motivation for which these 
variables were obtained for in the next sub-section. 
 
III.2) Methodology – Multiple Regression 
In order to be able to assess the impact of the introduction of the NID in Italy, a 
multiple regression was estimated. This regression aims at assessing if there is a significant 
change on the leverage ratio of the firms in our sample after the introduction of the NID. 
However, the chosen regression also comprises other explanatory variables that are mostly 
based on firm-specific characteristics, which have proven, in previous literature, to have an 
impact on the leverage ratio of firms.  
Most recent literature seems to be moving towards the direction of incorporating firm-
specific, and even country-specific effects in their models to explain capital structure 
decisions (Abe de Jong et al. 2008). Along that line of thought, this present dissertation 
incorporates in its methodology six explanatory variables: one variable of interest, that will 
assess the impact of the NID introduction in Italy, and five control variables that try to 
incorporate these firm-specific effects. 
 Therefore, the multiple regression that was put in place is described below: 
 
Levi =β0 + β1Sizei + β2Profit.i+ β3Growthi + β4Tang. i + β5 FinViab. + β6NID + Ɛi  
 




III.3) Variables Explanation   
 
III.3.1) Dependent Variable 
 Since the purpose of this study is to assess the impacts of changing tax policies in the 
capital structure of Italian firms, the dependent variable will obviously have to reflect the 
capital structure of these firms. Therefore, the dependent variable will be the leverage ratio of 
the firms included in our sample. This leverage ratio will be calculated as the ratio between 






 ), and Levi will represent the leverage ratio 
for firm i. It would have been also possible to use the long-term leverage ratio: instead of 
Total Debt we would have used Total Long-Term Debt to compute the ratio, but since we are 
interested in verifying if Italian firms decrease their overall levels of debt in the presence of 
the NID, it is best suited to check the impacts on a leverage ratio that incorporates all their 
debt. 
 
III.3.2) Explanatory Variables 
 As far as explanatory variables are concerned, these will be separated in two distinct 
“categories”: we will first define our variable of interest, following with a second category 
composed by control variables that try to account for the firm-specific effects. 
 
III.3.2.1) Variable of Interest 
 
 NID - This is the variable on which we will be more focused, since it is the variable 
that will try to explain the effect of changing tax policies in the leverage ratio of Italian firms. 
At this point, expect the results to show that: (1) the included dummy variable for the effect of 
the NID to be statistically significant and (2) the coefficient associated with this variable to be 
negative, which would evidence that the NID not only affects the capital structure of firms, 
but also indeed contributes to a lower leverage ratio, and therefore, to a lower credit risk 
among Italian firms. 
This variable will be a dummy variable, and consequently, will only take the value of 
either 0 or 1 (binary variable). When the firm-data gathered is in a period where the NID is 
put in practice (2011-2015), this variable will assume a value of 1. For the remaining years, 
this variable will always be equal to 0. However, since the NID was put only put in practice 
by the government in December 2011, we will also assume the value 0 for the year of 2011, 
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since the adjustment in not instantaneous. 
 
III.3.2.2) Control Variables 
 
 Size – throughout recent literature, one can see that there seems to be an evident 
empirical relationship between firm size and leverage. It seems that as firms grow in size, 
they tend to get, not only an easier access to credit, but also better credit conditions, which 
culminates in higher leverage ratios for bigger firms. Krushev et al. (2015) point out that even 
though there seem to be exceptions – some smaller firms seem to choose higher leverage 
when refinancing, to compensate for their less frequent refinancing periods – there is mainly a 
positive relationship between firm size and leverage.  
In our model, we will define Size as the natural logarithm of Total Assets (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒i
	
=
ln 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠i ).  We do this because our sample includes firms of different sizes, that can 
have big differences in terms of value and, therefore, by using the logarithm of the variable 
we reduce the absolute value of those differences, thus improving the model. We will expect 
that the coefficient associated with this variable is positive as per the reasons mentioned 
above. 
 
 Profitability – the second control variable we decided to include in our multiple 
regression is profitability. On one hand, one could think that more profitable firms could more 
easily get access to credit since they are ability to generate cash-flows is higher. However, the 
intuition behind the inclusion of this variable is the opposite, and may be related to the 
Pecking Order Theory: if one firm is very profitable, why should it incur in the costs of debt 
and its asymmetry of information, when it can fund itself internally? Frank et al. (2003) seem 
to corroborate this intuition. In their research regarding the relative importance of several 
factors in the leverage ratios of U.S firms, they show that profitability seems to negatively 
correlated with leverage, meaning that more profitable firms tend to have lower leverage 
ratios. 
In our regression, we will define Profitability as EBIT – Earnings before Interest and 
Taxes, divided by Total Assets. We initially thought to define Profitability by using the 
variable ROA – Return on Assets –, but by using EBIT we are most likely to avoid high 
correlation with other variables in the model since EBIT it is not affected by the impact of 








), and we will expect a negative coefficient associated to this 
variable. 
 
Growth – when measuring the tax benefits of Debt, Graham (2000) was focused on 
assessing how much of a firm’s value would be generated by the fiscal benefits of debt. 
However, Graham (2000) also seems to point out that during his research he found out 
evidence of other firm-specific factors, such as growth, to be associated with conservative 
debt policies (implying a negative relation between growth and leverage). More recently, 
Billett et al. (2007) conducted a research to specifically assess relationships between growth 
opportunities and leverage ratios, debt maturity and covenants. In this study, Billett et al. 
consistently observed this negative relationship between growth opportunities and leverage 
which, despite attenuated by the presence of covenant protections, was still evident.  
With this in mind, we define our variable Growth as the variation rate in the level of 
Net Sales or Revenues, which is a commonly used approach. Therefore, Growth will be 






− 1), as mentioned above, 
we will expect a negative coefficient associated with this variable. 
 
 Tangibility – this variable was one of the variables for which the decision to include 
it, or not, in the regression used was most difficult. Nowadays it seems that we can find more 
and more examples of firms which seem to have very few tangible assets within their asset 
structure, but that nonetheless present themselves as highly financed by debt (Lim et al. 
2016). This seems to be the result of a “new-age” of businesses: these businesses appear to 
emerge out of the opportunities created by our society’s technological advances. By using the 
internet, innumerable possibilities arose that enable companies to provide virtual services, 
without actually owning any physical assets. Therefore, most of their assets consist of 
intellectual property or softwares that seem to have no physical property. Even though Lim et 
al. (2016) show that there is a positive relationship between intangible assets and debt that is 
based on the fact that intangible assets can generate cash-flows as reliably as tangible ones, 
there are many studies that seem to evidence that there is a more significant relationship 
between asset tangibility and leverage (Hall, 2011). Hall (2011) seems to point out that 
companies with more tangible assets present themselves with higher leverage ratios. This is a 
consequence of the existing possibility for tangible assets, not only to generate reliable cash-
flows, but also to be more easily used as collateral in debt contracts. 
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After careful thought, we decided to include tangibility in our regression for two 
reasons: (1) it seems that most Italian firms do not fit the profile of the “new age” businesses 
described above and (2) the conclusions revealed by Hall (2011), among others, seem to be 
solid and not driven by industry concentrations. We will define the variable Tangibility as the 






) and, as evidenced by 
Hall’s conclusions (2011), we will expect a positive coefficient for the variable.   
 
Financial Viability – regarding firm-specific factors included in our analysis, this is 
the last factor that we believed that it could be relevant to add. The intuition behind it is that a 
company’s ability to pay its interests on outstanding debt, might not only condition its ability 
to contract further debt, but could also affect credit terms in case the firm can indeed engage 
in contracting new debt. 
In our regression, we will define Financial Viability as the Interest Coverage ratio, 
which is equal to the EBIT – Earnings before Interest and Taxes –, divided by Interest 









We will expect a negative coefficient for this variable, which is associated with the 
fact that firms that are more financially viable will have a lower need for debt. This goes in 












IV – Empirical Analysis & Results 
 
 We will initiate this section by providing detailed statistics of the variables included in 
our regression. Consequently, we will provide information regarding the correlations between 
those variables and follow up by showing our regression results. These results will be divided 
into three sub-sections. Finally, we conclude this section with a robustness test, to provide 
further significance to our results. 
 
IV.1) Descriptive Statistics  
In terms of working the sample used for the purpose of this study, the explanation for 
the treatment of outliers was the following: we decided to do something that seemed to fit a 
formal and literary approach: we winsorized every variable in our model (except the variable 
of interest – NID – since it is a dummy variable) by 5%. What this means is that we took the 
5% extremes from both the upper and lower tails of the distribution of each variable, and 
moved them respectively to the values corresponding to the values of the percentiles 5 and 95. 
We handled outliers in the same way, for the two groups in our analysis. 
Below, we provide three tables regarding information concerning these variables, after 
already handling the outliers. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the dependent variable, 
for both groups previously described in our study. Tables 2 and 3 show the detailed statistics 
for the independent variables, respectively, for the Financials and Non-Financials groups. 
 
Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics (Dependent Variable) 
Dependent	Variable	-	Leverage	(Financials)	 Dependent	Variable	-	Leverage	(Non-Financials)	
Percentiles	 Smallest	 	 	 Percentiles	 Smallest	 	 	
1%	 0	 0	 	 	 1%	 .019499	 .019499	 	 	
5%	 0	 0	 	 	 5%	 .019499	 .019499	 	 	
10%	 .0644524	 0	 Obs	 305	 10%	 .0521221	 .019499	 Obs	 1835	
25%	 .2301583	 0	 Sum	of	Wgt.	 305	 25%	 .1585335	 .019499	 Sum	of	Wgt.	 1835	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
50%	 .3456197	 	 Mean	 .3213423	 50%	 .2963058	 	 Mean	 .297643	
	 	 Largest	 Std.	Dev.	 .1570769	 	 	 Largest	 Std.	Dev.	 .1736537	
75%	 .4298907	 .5748129	 	 	 75%	 .4151829	 .6387459	 	 	
90%	 .5219639	 .5748129	 Variance	 .0246732	 90%	 .5523129	 .6387459	 Variance	 .0301556	
95%	 .5748129	 .5748129	 Skewness	 -.4540208	 95%	 .6387459	 .6387459	 Skewness	 .1937331	
99%	 .5748129	 .5748129	 Kurtosis	 2.484657	 99%	 .6387459	 .6387459	 Kurtosis	 2.225974	
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Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics (Independent Variables): Financials 
Independent	Variable	1	-	Size	 	 Independent	Variable	2	-	Profitability	 	
Percentiles	 Smallest	 	 	 Percentiles	 Smallest	 	 	
1%	 10.31837	 10.31837	 	 	 1%	 -.120547	 -.120547	 	 	
5%	 10.31837	 10.31837	 	 	 5%	 -.120547	 -.120547	 	 	
10%	 11.93614	 10.31837	 Obs	 306	 10%	 -.0457306	 -.120547	 Obs	 300	
25%	 13.93895	 10.31837	 Sum	of	Wgt.	 306	 25%	 .0011417	 -.120547	 Sum	of	Wgt.	 300	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
50%	 16.00334	 	 Mean	 15.78766	 50%	 .0118434	 	 Mean	 .0038285	
	 	 Largest	 Std.	Dev.	 2.622044	 	 	 Largest	 Std.	Dev.	 .039218	
75%	 17.69721	 20.26343	 	 	 75%	 .0204789	 .0610935	 	 	
90%	 18.89978	 20.26343	 Variance	 6.875113	 90%	 .0414739	 .0610935	 Variance	 .001538	
95%	 20.26343	 20.26343	 Skewness	 -.3277057	 95%	 .0610935	 .0610935	 Skewness	 -
1.777103	
99%	 20.26343	 20.26343	 Kurtosis	 2.430753	 99%	 .0610935	 .0610935	 Kurtosis	 6.465634	
Independent	Variable	3	-	Growth	 	 Independent	Variable	4	-	Tangibility	 	
Percentiles	 Smallest	 	 	 Percentiles	 Smallest	 	 	
1%	 -.6167281	 -.616728	 	 	 1%	 .001128	 .001128	 	 	
5%	 -.6167281	 -.616728	 	 	 5%	 .001128	 .001128	 	 	
10%	 -.2827576	 -.616728	 Obs	 273	 10%	 .0063949	 .001128	 Obs	 306	
25%	 -.1061282	 -.616728	 Sum	of	Wgt.	 273	 25%	 .0199603	 .001128	 Sum	of	Wgt.	 306	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
50%	 .0166149	 	 Mean	 .0569547	 50%	 .0310203	 	 Mean	 .0388705	
	 	 Largest	 Std.	Dev.	 .3556879	 	 	 Largest	 Std.	Dev.	 .0339618	
75%	 .1670518	 1.110709	 	 	 75%	 .0437962	 .145939	 	 	
90%	 .4253964	 1.110709	 Variance	 .1265139	 90%	 .0783008	 .145939	 Variance	 .0011534	
95%	 1.110709	 1.110709	 Skewness	 1.101911	 95%	 .145939	 .145939	 Skewness	 1.901468	
99%	 1.110709	 1.110709	 Kurtosis	 5.460781	 99%	 .145939	 .145939	 Kurtosis	 6.451296	
Independent	Variable	5	-	Financial	Viability	 	 Independent	Variable	6	-	NID	(Dummy)	 	
Percentiles	 Smallest	 	 	 Percentiles	 Smallest	 	 	
1%	 -44.6	 -44.6	 	 	 1%	 0	 0	 	 	
5%	 -44.6	 -44.6	 	 	 5%	 0	 0	 	 	
10%	 -8.142105	 -44.6	 Obs	 289	 10%	 0	 0	 Obs	 308	
25%	 .4438033	 -44.6	 Sum	of	Wgt.	 289	 25%	 0	 0	 Sum	of	Wgt.	 308	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
50%	 1.850219	 	 Mean	 1.734067	 50%	 0	 	 Mean	 .3636364	
	 	 Largest	 Std.	Dev.	 14.32217	 	 	 Largest	 Std.	Dev.	 .4818285	
75%	 3.617325	 31.46491	 	 	 75%	 1	 1	 	 	
90%	 17.40631	 31.46491	 Variance	 205.1245	 90%	 1	 1	 Variance	 .2321587	
95%	 31.46491	 31.46491	 Skewness	 -1.159743	 95%	 1	 1	 Skewness	 .5669467	





Table 3 – Descriptive Statistics (Independent Variables): Non-Financials 
Independent	Variable	1	-	Size	 	 Independent	Variable	2	-	Profitability	 	
Percentiles	 Smallest	 	 	 Percentiles	 Smallest	 	 	
1%	 10.54737	 10.54737	 	 	 1%	 -.1423909	 -.1423909	 	 	
5%	 10.54737	 10.54737	 	 	 5%	 -.1423909	 -.1423909	 	 	
10%	 10.98661	 10.54737	 Obs	 1835	 10%	 -.0673193	 -.1423909	 Obs	 1808	
25%	 11.92045	 10.54737	 Sum	of	Wgt.	 1835	 25%	 .0003432	 -.1423909	 Sum	of	Wgt.	 1808	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
50%	 12.993	 	 Mean	 13.331	 50%	 .0397705	 	 Mean	 .0313563	
	 	 Largest	 Std.	Dev.	 1.855307	 	 	 Largest	 Std.	Dev.	 .0704138	
75%	 14.59948	 17.17213	 	 	 75%	 .0748413	 .149969	 	 	
90%	 16.07966	 17.17213	 Variance	 3.442163	 90%	 .116733	 .149969	 Variance	 .0049581	
95%	 17.17213	 17.17213	 Skewness	 .4540068	 95%	 .149969	 .149969	 Skewness	 -
.6729476	
99%	 17.17213	 17.17213	 Kurtosis	 2.280017	 99%	 .149969	 .149969	 Kurtosis	 3.325458	
Independent	Variable	3	-	Growth	 	 Independent	Variable	4	-	Tangibility	 	
Percentiles	 Smallest	 	 	 Percentiles	 Smallest	 	 	
1%	 -.3871188	 -.387118	 	 	 1%	 .0123968	 .0123968	 	 	
5%	 -.3871188	 -.387118	 	 	 5%	 .0123968	 .0123968	 	 	
10%	 -.2141018	 -.387118	 Obs	 1666	 10%	 .0249062	 .0123968	 Obs	 1835	
25%	 -.0711818	 -.387118	 Sum	of	Wgt.	 1666	 25%	 .0856907	 .0123968	 Sum	of	Wgt.	 1835	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
50%	 .0230367	 	 Mean	 .0285161	 50%	 .2040986	 	 Mean	 .2544357	
	 	 Largest	 Std.	Dev.	 .1931599	 	 	 Largest	 Std.	Dev.	 .2009898	
75%	 .1223136	 .4489812	 	 	 75%	 .3854673	 .6953256	 	 	
90%	 .288247	 .4489812	 Variance	 .0373108	 90%	 .5638735	 .6953256	 Variance	 .0403969	
95%	 .4489812	 .4489812	 Skewness	 .0603463	 95%	 .6953256	 .6953256	 Skewness	 .7025498	
99%	 .4489812	 .4489812	 Kurtosis	 3.270309	 99%	 .6953256	 .6953256	 Kurtosis	 2.429915	
Independent	Variable	5	-	Financial	Viability	 	 Independent	Variable	6	-	NID	(Dummy)	 	
Percentiles	 Smallest	 	 	 Percentiles	 Smallest	 	 	
1%	 -12.46917	 -12.4691	 	 	 1%	 0	 0	 	 	
5%	 -12.46917	 -12.4691	 	 	 5%	 0	 0	 	 	
10%	 -5.163688	 -12.4691	 Obs	 1807	 10%	 0	 0	 Obs	 1859	
25%	 .0006463	 -12.4691	 Sum	of	Wgt.	 1807	 25%	 0	 0	 Sum	of	Wgt.	 1859	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
50%	 3.160747	 	 Mean	 6.679925	 50%	 0	 	 Mean	 .3636364	
	 	 Largest	 Std.	Dev.	 13.85701	 	 	 Largest	 Std.	Dev.	 .4811751	
75%	 8.290769	 50.16484	 	 	 75%	 1	 1	 	 	
90%	 23.55924	 50.16484	 Variance	 192.0168	 90%	 1	 1	 Variance	 .2315295	
95%	 50.16484	 50.16484	 Skewness	 1.776922	 95%	 1	 1	 Skewness	 .5669467	
99%	 50.16484	 50.16484	 Kurtosis	 6.178076	 99%	 1	 1	 Kurtosis	 1.321429	
 
 As we can see from the tables above, we seem to have a relatively well-balanced panel 
of companies for the two groups. In terms of firm size, we can detect firms with low and high 
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size, without much difference in the means for both groups. When looking at Profitability, we 
also have included profitable and non-profitable firms for both groups, but it is interesting to 
see that the average Profitability for the Financials group is almost ten times the value for 
Non-Financial firms. When looking at Growth, we can see that we have included firms that 
are growing as well as firms that have decreasing revenues, which seem to be in a more 
mature state (some even in a state of bankruptcy).  It also seems evident that we incorporate 
firms that have both high and low levels of Tangibility, and, as expected, the level of 
Tangibility is much higher for the Non-Financials group. As far as Financial Viability is 
concerned, we can see that even though we winsorized our variables at 5%, there is still a 
great level of variance.   
 In principle, since the data seems to be well-balanced, all this evidence combined 
should allow for a good overall representativeness of the results we obtained. 
 
IV.2) Correlations 
 When looking at the correlations between the dependent variable and the explanatory 
variables incorporated in our model, conclusions can be drawn regarding the relationship of 
these variables with the level of Leverage. We can also check for high correlations between 
explanatory variables, that can evidence multicollinearity problems. 
 Tables 4 and 5, presented below, show Pearson’s correlation coefficients (which 
assumes a linear relationship between variables) for both groups in our analysis.  
 
Table 4 – Pearson Coefficients (Financials group) 
Pearson's	Correlation	Coefficients	 	 	 	 	
	 Leverage	 Size	 Profitability	 Growth	 Tangibility	 Fin.Viability	 NID	
Leverage	 1.0000		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Size	 0.5542	 1.0000		 	 	 	 	 	
Profitability	 0.1918	 0.4238	 1.0000		 	 	 	 	
Growth	 -0.0322	 -0.0113	 0.1832	 1.0000		 	 	 	
Tangibility	 0.0243	 -0.2602	 -0.4390	 -0.0634	 1.0000		 	 	
Fin.Viability	 0.0841	 0.1969	 0.7169	 0.1972	 -0.3045	 1.0000		 	
NID	 -0.0045	 0.0464	 -0.1363	 -0.0249	 -0.0775	 -0.1088	 1.0000		
 
  
 When looking at the correlation coefficients for the Financials group, one can see that 
the apparent existing high correlations all come from the variables Size and Profitability. Size 
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is the only variable that shows significant correlation with the dependent variable (around 
50%), while Profitability shows significant correlation with other explanatory variables 
(namely Size, Tangibility and Financial Viability).  
 Another interesting aspect that we can observe from this Table is that for this group 
our variable of interest (NID) seems to be negatively correlated to our dependent variable 
(Leverage) and to the majority of the explanatory variables, except for Size. This could 
perhaps be an indicator, for future analyses, that Financial firms might verify an increase in 
Size, when in the presence of the NID (please note that correlation does not imply causality. It 
is simply an indicator of a possible positive relationship). 
 
Table 5 – Pearson Coefficients (Non-Financials group) 
Pearson's	Correlation	Coefficients	 	 	 	 	
	 Leverage	 Size	 Profitability	 Growth	 Tangibility	 Fin.Viability	 NID	
Leverage	 1.0000		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Size	 0.0356	 1.0000		 	 	 	 	 	
Profitability	 -0.3012	 0.2561	 1.0000		 	 	 	 	
Growth	 -0.1219	 0.0713	 0.3119	 1.0000		 	 	 	
Tangibility	 0.2558	 0.1057	 -0.0361	 -0.0189	 1.0000		 	 	
Fin.Viability	 -0.4936	 0.0353	 0.6598	 0.1822	 -0.1336	 1.0000		 	
NID	 0.0573	 0.0119	 -0.1256	 -0.1511	 -0.0294	 -0.0677	 1.0000		
 
 Focusing on the Pearson coefficients for correlations in respect to the Non-Financials 
group, we can see some major differences when comparing to the Financials group: first of 
all, the variable that seems to have more correlation with the other in the Financials group 
(Size) is no longer highly correlated neither with our dependent variable, neither with 
Tangibility. It seems that the only relatively high correlation it maintained is with the variable 
Profitability. When considering this different group in our sample (Non-Financials), 
Profitability is still highly correlated with other explanatory variables, but in this case, mostly 
with Growth and Financial Viability. Another important difference, that goes against our 
initial intuition is that the NID is slightly positively correlated to Leverage. We will address 
this issue in the next sub-section.  
 
IV.3) Regression Results 
IV.3.1) Fixed vs Random-effects 
 Before running our regressions for the two distinct groups, we had to decide either to 
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use a Fixed-effects or a Random-effects regression for each of these groups. This decision 
was made based on the results of the Hausman test. Under this test, the null hypothesis is that 
a Random-effects regression is best suited for the data we are using, while the alternative 
hypothesis is that a Fixed-effects regression is better. We performed the Hausman test for the 
two groups in our study, and we evidenced that both for the Financials, and the Non-
Financials groups, we would reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the Fixed-effects 
regression was best suited. 
 Below, we can see Tables 6 and 7 that show the results of the Hausman test, 
respectively for the Financial and Non-Financials group. 
 
Table 6 – Hausman test results (Financials group) 
	 (b)	 (B)	 (b-B)	 sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))	
	 fe	 re	 Difference	 S.E.	
Size	 .08883	 .0397915	 .0490385	 .015555	
Profitability	 .2352153	 .124364	 .1108512	 .	
Growth	 -.0014599	 .0033852	 -.0048451	 .	
Tangibility	 .4306515	 .6584391	 -.2277876	 .0288514	
Fin.Viability	 .000042	 .0003349	 -.0002928	 .0000454	
NID	 -.007111	 -.0023015	 -.0048095	 .	
	 	 	 	 	
	Test:		Ho:		difference	in	coefficients	not	systematic	 	
	chi2(6)		 =	(b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)	 	
	 	=							15.09	 	 Prob>chi2	=						0.0196	
	 	 	 (V_b-V_B	is	not	positive	definite)	
 
  
 As we can see, for a significance level of 5%, and with a Probabilitity>chi2 equal to 
1.96%, we have to reject the null hypothesis that a Random-effects model is more 
appropriate, and therefore, the suited regression for the Financials group is, the Fixed-effects 







Table 7 – Hausman test results (Non-Financials group) 
	 (b)	 (B)	 (b-B)	 sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))	
	 fe	 re	 Difference	 S.E.	
Size	 .0421669	 .0169075	 .0252594	 .0057236	
Profitability	 -.4395955	 -.3937209	 -.0458746	 .0023662	
Growth	 -.0019152	 .0017696	 -.0036848	 .	
Tangibility	 .073604	 .0904754	 -.0168714	 .007927	
Fin.Viability	 -.0008	 -.0014923	 .0006924	 .0000668	
NID	 .0077866	 .0075165	 .0002701	 .	
	 	 	 	 	
	Test:		Ho:		difference	in	coefficients	not	systematic	 	
	chi2(6)		 =	(b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)	 	
	 	=							69.26	 	 Prob>chi2	=						0.0000	
	 	 	 (V_b-V_B	is	not	positive	definite)	
  
 When looking at the Non-Financials group, it seems that for a significance level of 
5%, we also have to reject the null hypothesis, and as a consequence, the Fixed-effects 
regression is, again, the most appropriate one. 
 Therefore, the regression outputs in the next sub-section were generated having these 
results into consideration. 
 
IV.3.2) Regression Outputs 
 When looking at the first results obtained, they seem to be quite different for the two 
groups in our analysis. Below, in tables 8 and 9, we have the STATA outputs of the initial 
regressions we ran for both groups. 
 
Table 8 - Initial Regression Output (Financials) 
Fixed-effects	(within)	regression		 		Number	of	obs						=								 257	 	
Group	variable:		 CompanyCode			 	 	Number	of	groups			=								 28	 	
R-sq:		 	within		=			 0.1729	 	Obs	per	
group:	
	 	min	=	 5	
	 between	=		 0.3667	 	 	 avg	=	 9.2	
	 overall	=				 0.3310	 	 	 	max	=	 10	
	 	 	 	 F(6,223)							=						 7.77	 	
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Leverage	 Coef.	 Std.	Err.	 z				 	P>z	 [95%	Conf.	 Interval]	
Size	 .08883	 .0167697	 5.30	 0.000	 .0557827	 .1218773	
Profitability	 .2352153	 .2465845	 0.95	 0.341	 -.2507187	 .7211492	
Growth	 -.0014599	 .0147607	 -0.10	 0.921	 -.0305483	 .0276285	
Tangibility	 .4306515	 .2061464	 2.09	 0.038	 .0244073	 .8368957	
Fin.Viability	 .000042	 .000596	 0.07	 0.944	 -.0011326	 .0012166	
NID	 -.007111	 .0107481	 -0.66	 0.509	 -.0282919	 .0140699	
_cons	 -1.104122	 .264036	 -4.18	 0.000	 -1.624447	 -.583797	
 
  
 Looking at Table 8, we can see from the initial results regarding the financials group, 
that there are several relevant aspects to evidence: (i) Regarding the control variables, and as 
expected, the coefficients associated with the variables Size and Tangibility are positive. This 
goes in line with previous literature mentioned in Section 3. We also verify that the 
coefficients associated with the variables Growth, Profitability and Financial Viability are not 
significant, which makes it impossible for us to draw any conclusions since we cannot infer 
that they are statistically different from zero. This may derive from the small sample of firms 
that we have in the Financials group. (ii) In respect to the variable of interest, NID, we can 
also state that the associated coefficient associated to this variable is not statistically different 
from zero. Even if this coefficient is negative in the first column of Table 8, we can see from 
the 95% confidence interval in the last two columns that it belongs to a range that includes 
both positive and negative values. Therefore, based on Table 8, we can make no conclusions 
regarding the impact of the NID in the leverage ratio of Financial firms. (iii) finally, even 
though the R squared of the model is not high (around 33%), we can see that overall 
significance of the model is attested for a 5% significance level, since the Probability > F = 
0.0000. 
  In the next sub-section (Regression Adaptations) we will perform some adjustments to 
this initial regression, to check if we can improve our results, since it seems that we have 








Table 9 - Initial Regression Output (Non-Financials) 
Fixed-effects	(within)	regression		 		Number	of	obs						=								 1639	 	
Group	variable:		 CompanyCode			 	 	Number	of	groups			=								 169	 	
R-sq:		 	within		=			 0.1199	 	Obs	per	
group:	
	 	min	=	 5	
	 between	=		 0.0508	 	 	 avg	=	 9.7	
	 overall	=				 0.0610	 	 	 	max	=	 10	
	 	 	 	 F(6,1464)		=						 33.25	 	
corr(u_i,	X)=	-
0.2545	
	 	 	 Prob	>	F				=	 0.0000	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Leverage	 Coef.	 Std.	Err.	 z				 	P>z	 [95%	Conf.	 Interval]	
Size	 .0421669	 .0070966	 5.94	 0.000	 .0282463	 .0560875	
Profitability	 -.4395955	 .0585621	 -7.51	 0.000	 -.55447	 -.3247209	
Growth	 -.0019152	 .0119588	 -0.16	 0.873	 -.0253735	 .0215431	
Tangibility	 .073604	 .0224239	 3.28	 0.001	 .0296176	 .1175904	
Fin.Viability	 -.0008	 .0003389	 -2.36	 0.018	 -.0014648	 -.0001351	
NID	 .0077866	 .0043414	 1.79	 0.073	 -.0007295	 .0163026	
_cons	 -.2647891	 .0954851	 -2.77	 0.006	 -.4520914	 -.0774868	
  
 When we look at Table 9, there are some immediate differences one can detect when 
comparing with the results from the Financials group. (i) It seems that for the Non-Financials 
group, the coefficient associated with Profitability is negative, which goes in line to what we 
expected. Also, the coefficient associated with Financial Viability changed, and is now 
negative, which again seems to go in line with existing literature and consequently, to what 
we expected beforehand. (ii) the coefficients associated with Size and Tangibility and did not 
change, and remain in line to what we were initially hoping to get. However, the coefficient 
associated to the variable Growth is not statistically different from zero, just like in Table 8. 
(iii) The coefficient associated with the variable of interest, NID, is positive, which is 
something that contradicts its intended effect and that we were not expecting to obtain. 
However, this is only true for a significance level of 10%. (iv) Finally, when considering a 
5% significance level, all variables in the model seem to be significant, apart from Growth 
and our variable of interest – NID –. However, our variable of interest is significant when 
considering a 10% significance level, whereas Growth would imply a significance level above 
80% to be significant. Again, in the next sub-section (Regression Adaptions) we will address 
these issues. 
 We can also see that the overall regression has a low value in terms of the R squared 
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(around 8%), but the general significance of the model is attested by looking at the 
Probability > F which is 0.0000. 
 
IV.3.3) Regression Adaptations 
 
IV.3.3.1) Adaptations: Non-Financials group 
 After analysing the outputs from the initial regressions, the major issue we found was 
the positive coefficient associated with the NID variable, for the Non-Financials group. This 
would mean that, in the presence of the NID, firms would become more leveraged, which for 
us did not make sense given the theoretical framework we discussed before. Therefore, we 
decided to run regressions containing interaction terms of the control variables, multiplied by 
the variable of interest. In these regressions, we decided not to drop the variable Growth, 
since by doing so, we would not be able to assess whether the source of our changes in results 
would come from adding the interaction term, or from dropping the variable. Since the 
variable Growth was not significant, we decided not run any regressions including an 
interaction term with that variable. The different regressions we ran, for the Non-Financials 
group, are the following: 
 
(i)Levi =β0 + β1Sizei + β2Profit.i + β3Growthi + β4Tang.i + β5FinViab.i + β6NID + 
β7Size*NID + Ɛi 
 
(ii)Levi =β0 + β1Sizei + β2Profit.i + β3Growthi + β4Tang.i + β5FinViab.i + β6NID + 
β7Profit.*NID + Ɛi 
 
(iii)Levi =β0 + β1Sizei + β2Profit.i + β3Growthi + β4Tang.i + β5FinViab.i + β6NID + 
β7Tang.*NID + Ɛi 
 
(iv)Levi =β0 + β1Sizei + β2Profit.i + β3Growthi + β4Tang.i + β5FinViab.i + β6NID + 
β7FinViab.*NID + Ɛi 
  
 What we intended with these regressions was to check if we could identify at least one 
interaction variable with a negative coefficient associated, meaning that the NID would only 
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lead lower leverage ratios for firms with specific characteristics. Since the coefficient 
associated with the NID variable for the Financials group was already negative, there was no 
need to run these regressions for that particular group. 
 In our analysis, we will not show the outputs of regressions (iii) and (iv) since the 
coefficients associated with the interaction variable in all those regressions were still positive, 
and therefore, there seemed to be no need in evidencing them. However, Tables 10 and 11, 
presented below, show the output of regressions (i) and (ii), which seemed to provide 
interesting results, that go in line with the intended effect of the NID introduction (especially 
regression ii). 
 
Table 10 - Adapted Regression (i) (Non-Financials) 
Fixed-effects	(within)	regression		 		Number	of	obs						=								 1639	 	
Group	variable:		 CompanyCode			 	Number	of	groups			=								 169	 	
R-sq:		 	within		=			 0.1253	 	Obs	per	group:	 	min	=	 5	
	 between	=		 0.0467	 	 	 avg	=	 9.7	
	 overall	=				 0.0578	 	 	 	max	=	 10	
	 	 	 	 F(7,1463)				=						 29.94	 	
corr(u_i,	X)			=	-0.2824	 	 	 Prob	>	F							=	 0.0000	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Leverage	 Coef.	 Std.	Err.	 z				 	P>z	 [95%	Conf.	 Interval]	
Size	 .0470935	 .0072654	 6.48	 0.000	 .0328418	 .0613452	
Profitability	 -.4462395	 .0584448	 -7.64	 0.000	 -.5608841	 -.331595	
Growth	 -.003227	 .0119343	 -0.27	 0.787	 -.0266372	 .0201832	
Tangibility	 .0718734	 .0223704	 3.21	 0.001	 .027992	 .1157548	
Fin.Viability	 -.000778	 .0003381	 -2.30	 0.022	 -.0014413	 -.0001148	
NID	 .09988	 .0310063	 3.22	 0.001	 .0390584	 .1607017	
sizeNID	 -.0068945	 .0022985	 -3.00	 0.003	 -.0114032	 -.0023857	
_cons	 -.3300289	 .0976777	 -3.38	 0.001	 -.5216323	 -.1384256	
 
  
 For this regression, where we include an interaction variable equal to Size*NID 
(referred to as sizeNID in Table 10) we can see that even though the coefficients associated 
with the variables Size and NID by themselves are positive, the result of the interaction term 
between these two variables has a negative coefficient associated to it (with a P value of 
0.000, which makes it significant). This means that the observed impact of the NID (for Non-
Financial firms) in increasing Italian firms’ leverage ratios is smaller for larger firms. In that 
case, for larger size firms, the NID would lead to an increase in leverage ratios that is lower 
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than for smaller size firms. We can also see that the P value for the NID variable decreased to 
0.001, and that the majority of the P values observed for the control variables makes them 
significant for a 5% significance level. 
 
Table 11 - Adapted Regression (ii) (Non-Financials) 
Fixed-effects	(within)	regression		 		Number	of	obs						=								 1639	 	
Group	variable:		 CompanyCode			 	Number	of	groups			=								 169	 	
R-sq:		 	within		=			 0.1356	 	Obs	per	group:	 	min	=	 5	
	 between	=		 0.0307	 	 	 avg	=	 9.7	
	 overall	=				 0.0416	 	 	 	max	=	 10	
	 	 	 	 F(7,1463)				=						 32.78	 	
corr(u_i,	X)			=	-0.4062	 	 	 Prob	>	F							=	 0.0000	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Leverage	 Coef.	 Std.	Err.	 z				 	P>z	 [95%	Conf.	 Interval]	
Size	 .0546544	 .0074421	 7.34	 0.000	 .040056	 .0692528	
Profitability	 -.3177284	 .0627009	 -5.07	 0.000	 -.4407215	 -.1947352	
Growth	 -.0057848	 .0118799	 -0.49	 0.626	 -.0290882	 .0175186	
Tangibility	 .0690194	 .022249	 3.10	 0.002	 .025376	 .1126627	
Fin.Viability	 -.0007925	 .000336	 -2.36	 0.018	 -.0014517	 -.0001333	
NID	 .0166597	 .0046365	 3.59	 0.000	 .0075648	 .0257546	
profitNID	 -.3503235	 .0680613	 -5.15	 0.000	 -.4838316	 -.2168154	
_cons	 -.4347139	 .1002558	 -4.34	 0.000	 -.6313744	 -.2380534	
 
 As far as Non-Financials are concerned, this seems to be our best regression in terms 
of results: not only are all coefficients associated with our variables significant (except for 
Growth), but we can see that, even though the NID seems to lead to an increase close to 2% in 
leverage ratios, for more profitable firms there is a high decrease in that effect (evidenced by 
the coefficient associated with our interaction term equal to around 35%). This is indeed more 
in line to what we initially hoped to achieve. We will later interpret this result in section IV. 
 
 From this point on, we will consider our Adapted Regression (ii) (for the Non-
Financials group) as our Final Regression for this group, since it seems to be the most 
relevant. 
 
IV.3.3.2) Adaptations: Financials group 
 The second set of adaptations to our initial regressions was done to the Financials 
group. Even though we had decided to avoid as much as possible to remove any variables 
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from our initial regressions, it seemed that due to the extremely high P value observed 
regarding the variables Growth and Financial Viability, we decided we had to run a regression 
where we would exclude these variables. There were other variables that had coefficients with 
relatively high P values, but we decided to keep them for the theoretical reasons mentioned 
above and due to the fact that, despite not significant at a 5%-10% level, their inclusion 
contributed to the overall significance for the model. The adapted regression ran was, 
therefore, the following: 
 
(i) Levi =β0 + β1Sizei + β2Profit.i + β3Tang. i + β4NID + Ɛi 
  
 Below, in Table 12, we can see the results of that regression, which was mainly 
intended at increasing the significance of the negative coefficient associated with the NID 
variable (meaning: decreasing its P value).  
 
Table 12 - Adapted Regression (i) (Financials) 
Fixed-effects	(within)	regression		 		Number	of	obs						=								 299	 	
Group	variable:		 CompanyCode			 	Number	of	groups			=								 28	 	
R-sq:		 	within		=			 0.1543	 	Obs	per	group:	 	min	=	 9	
	 between	=		 0.4040	 	 	 avg	=	 10.7	
	 overall	=				 0.3208	 	 	 	max	=	 11	
	 	 	 	 F(4,267)				=						 12.18	 	
corr(u_i,	X)			=	-0.7400	 	 	 Prob	>	F							=	 0.0000	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Leverage	 Coef.	 Std.	Err.	 z				 	P>z	 [95%	Conf.	 Interval]	
Size	 .0779012	 .0131714	 5.91	 0.000	 .0519681	 .1038342	
Profitability	 .1920912	 .1996191	 0.96	 0.337	 -.2009366	 .585119	
Tangibility	 .464106	 .1876835	 2.47	 0.014	 .094578	 .833634	
NID	 -.011799	 .0107536	 -1.10	 0.274	 -.0329716	 .0093736	
_cons	 -.9218063	 .205866	 -4.48	 0.000	 -1.327133	 -.516479	
 
 As evidenced from the results above, we can see that after excluding the variables 
Growth and Financial Viability from our model, the significance of the coefficient associated 
with our variable of interest also improved (P value decreased to around half of its value in 
the initial regression). Also, even though we cannot state that the coefficient associated to our 
variable of interest is significantly different from zero, we can observe that its P value 
decreased to almost half of its initial value. 
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 Due to the results we obtained in the adapted regressions, for the Non-Financials 
group, we decided to check if the inclusion of the interaction terms Size*NID and 
Profitability*NID would lead to the same conclusions regarding the Financials group. 
Therefore, we ran two additional regressions, that incorporated the removal of the variables 
Growth and Financial Viability (as before), and also an interaction term. The two extra 
regressions we ran are the following: 
 
(ii) Levi =β0 + β1Sizei + β2Profit.i + β3Tang. i + β4NID + β5SizeNID	+	Ɛi 
(iii) Levi =β0 + β1Sizei + β2Profit.i + β3Tang. i + β4NID + β5Profit.NID	+	Ɛi 
 
 However, after looking at the outputs we got from these regressions, we verified that 
the results are not at all similar to the Non-Financials group. The interaction term 
Profitability*NID has now a positive coefficient associated that is not significant and 
therefore, we have no need to display its results since it will not affect our conclusions. (see 
Appendix 2). However, the inclusion of the interaction term Size*NID does have a negative 
coefficient, but at the same time it makes the coefficient of the NID variable positive, and 
makes it significant for a 10% significance level. Results can be seen in Table 13, displayed 
below: 
 
Table 13 - Adapted Regression (ii) (Financials) 
Fixed-effects	(within)	regression		 		Number	of	obs						=								 299	 	
Group	variable:		 CompanyCode			 	Number	of	groups			=								 28	 	
R-sq:		 	within		=			 0.1661	 	Obs	per	group:	 	min	=	 9	
	 between	=		 0.4047	 	 	 avg	=	 10.7	
	 overall	=				 0.3236	 	 	 	max	=	 11	
	 	 	 	 F(5,266)				=						 10.60	 	
corr(u_i,	X)			=	-0.7371	 	 	 Prob	>	F							=	 0.0000	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Leverage	 Coef.	 Std.	Err.	 z				 	P>z	 [95%	Conf.	 Interval]	
Size	 .0801518	 .0131557	 6.09	 0.000	 .0542493	 .1060544	
Profitability	 .2088761	 .1987899	 1.05	 0.294	 -.1825257	 .600278	
Tangibility	 .4972889	 .1875115	 2.65	 0.008	 .1280934	 .8664844	
NID	 .102638	 .0600901	 1.71	 0.089	 -.0156748	 .2209508	
sizeNID	 -.0071759	 .0037078	 -1.94	 0.054	 -.0144764	 .0001245	
_cons	 -.9586263	 .2056973	 -4.66	 0.000	 -1.363628	 -.5536242	
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 Since our objective is to be able to apply our results to a wider set of companies as 
possible, we will consider our Adapted Regression (i) (for the Financials group), as our Final 
Regression, since it does not limit the impact of the NID to a specific group of firms, within 
the Financials group. 
 
IV.4) Additional Robustness Tests 
 When checking the results obtained for robustness we decided to proceed in two 
different ways: the first one will be handling the outliers in our sample in a similar, but 
different way. The second approach we decided to implement when assessing for the 
robustness of our results was to limit the time span of our analysis.  
 Consequently, we applied these two approaches to our altered regressions, not to the 
initial ones since, after the changes, we improved our results. Results from these two 
approaches are presented below. 
 
IV.4.1) Different handling of outliers 
 Regarding the different way of handling the outliers in our sample, we decided to 
check if by winsorizing them at 1% (meaning moving the lower and upper 1% extremes 
respectively to the values corresponding to percentiles 1 and 99, our results would hold. 
 Table 14 and 15, presented below, show the results of our adapted regressions, with 
the variables winsorized at 1%, for the Financial group. Table 14 shows the results of our 
Adapted Regression (i), which excludes the Growth and Financial Viability variables, while 
Table 15 not only excludes these variables, but also incorporates the interaction term 
Size*NID (which corresponds to our Adapted Regression (ii)). However, we are now 
winsorizing all variables at 1%, while before they were winsorized at 5%. 
 
 
Table 14 - Adapted Regression (i): Financials – 1% Winsorized 
Fixed-effects	(within)	regression		 		Number	of	obs						=								 299	 	
Group	variable:		 CompanyCode			 	Number	of	groups			=								 28	 	
R-sq:		 	within		=			 0.0868	 	Obs	per	group:	 	min	=	 9	
	 between	=		 0.3493	 	 	 avg	=	 10.7	
	 overall	=				 0.2713	 	 	 	max	=	 11	
	 	 	 	 F(4,267)				=						 6.34	 	
corr(u_i,	X)			=	-0.4208	 	 	 Prob	>	F							=	 0.0001	 	
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Leverage	 Coef.	 Std.	Err.	 z				 	P>z	 [95%	Conf.	 Interval]	
Size	 .0527611	 .0137788	 3.83	 0.000	 .0256323	 .07989	
Profitability	 -.0195078	 .1134029	 -0.17	 0.864	 -.2427856	 .2037699	
Tangibility	 .3037629	 .117731	 2.58	 0.010	 .0719636	 .5355621	
NID	 -.0152616	 .0118213	 -1.29	 0.198	 -.0385364	 .0080132	
_cons	 -.5097546	 .2156505	 -2.36	 0.019	 -.9343464	 -.0851628	
 
  
 As we can see from this table, results from our adapted regression (i), when 
winsorizing the variables at 1%, do not seem to variate much from what we could verify in 
the adapted regression we initially put in place: the first thing just jumps to mind is that the P 
value associated with the Profitability variable to be higher. The coefficient associated with 
Profitability is also the only coefficient associated with the explanatory variables in our model 
that changes in terms of signal (goes from positive to negative), but since we cannot give 
statistical significance to that coefficient, this is not conclusive. Finally, in terms of absolute 
value we can see that the impact of the NID is a bit higher (1,5%), but still similar to the 1,1% 
impact in the leverage ratios of Financial firms, verified before. 
 
Table 15 - Adapted Regression (ii): Financials – 1% Winsorized 
Fixed-effects	(within)	regression		 		Number	of	obs						=								 299	 	
Group	variable:		 CompanyCode			 	Number	of	groups			=								 28	 	
R-sq:		 	within		=			 0.1001	 	Obs	per	group:	 	min	=	 9	
	 between	=		 0.3476	 	 	 avg	=	 10.7	
	 overall	=				 0.2728	 	 	 	max	=	 11	
	 	 	 	 F(5,266)				=						 5.92	 	
corr(u_i,	X)			=	-0.4507	 	 	 Prob	>	F							=	 0.0000	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Leverage	 Coef.	 Std.	Err.	 z				 	P>z	 [95%	Conf.	 Interval]	
Size	 .0569549	 .013866	 4.11	 0.000	 .0296539	 .0842559	
Profitability	 .0306474	 .1155866	 0.27	 0.791	 -.1969335	 .2582284	
Tangibility	 .3185634	 .1173274	 2.72	 0.007	 .0875548	 .5495721	
NID	 .1113695	 .0649321	 1.72	 0.087	 -.0164768	 .2392158	
sizeNID	 -.0079434	 .0040058	 -1.98	 0.048	 -.0158304	 -.0000563	
_cons	 -.5764731	 .217099	 -2.66	 0.008	 -1.003924	 -.149022	
 
 Again, when looking at Table 15, we can see that for the adapted regression (ii) 
concerning the Financials group, none of the coefficients changes its signal, and also none of 
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them change significantly in absolute terms, which means that for this group, results seem 
robust when changing the handling of outliers. 
  
 When checking for robustness regarding the treatment of outliers for the Non-
Financials group, results are shown below in Tables 16 and 17. Table 16 includes the 
interaction Size*NID, and therefore reflects our Adapted Regression (i) for the Non-
Financials group, when variables are winsorized at 1%. 
 
 
Table 16 - Adapted Regression (i): Non-Financials – 1% Winsorized 
Fixed-effects	(within)	regression		 		Number	of	obs						=								 1639	 	
Group	variable:		 CompanyCode			 	Number	of	groups			=								 169	 	
R-sq:		 	within		=			 0.1388	 	Obs	per	group:	 	min	=	 5	
	 between	=		 0.0796	 	 	 avg	=	 9.7	
	 overall	=				 0.0949	 	 	 	max	=	 10	
	 	 	 	 F(7,1436)				=						 33.68	 	
corr(u_i,	X)			=	-0.0436	 	 	 Prob	>	F							=	 0.0000	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Leverage	 Coef.	 Std.	Err.	 z				 	P>z	 [95%	Conf.	 Interval]	
Size	 .0288911	 .0078219	 3.69	 0.000	 .0135478	 .0442344	
Profitability	 -.4932448	 .0386873	 -12.75	 0.000	 -.5691333	 -.4173563	
Growth	 .0052887	 .0079096	 0.67	 0.504	 -.0102268	 .0208041	
Tangibility	 .1002925	 .0235479	 4.26	 0.000	 .0541012	 .1464838	
Fin.Viability	 .0000666	 .0001291	 0.52	 0.606	 -.0001865	 .0003198	
NID	 .0955054	 .0333012	 2.87	 0.004	 .0301822	 .1608286	
sizeNID	 -.006322	 .0024568	 -2.57	 0.010	 -.0111413	 -.0015028	
_cons	 -.0972789	 .1053871	 -0.92	 0.356	 -.3040048	 .1094471	
 
  
 Table 17 includes the interaction term Profitability*NID, therefore reflecting our 
Adapted Regression (ii), but now winsorizing the variables at 1%, instead of the previous 






Table 17 - Adapted Regression (ii): Non-Financials – 1% Winsorized 
Fixed-effects	(within)	regression		 		Number	of	obs						=								 1639	 	
Group	variable:		 CompanyCode			 	Number	of	groups			=								 169	 	
R-sq:		 	within		=			 0.1432	 	Obs	per	group:	 	min	=	 5	
	 between	=		 0.0592	 	 	 avg	=	 9.7	
	 overall	=				 0.0777	 	 	 	max	=	 10	
	 	 	 	 F(7,1463)				=						 34.92	 	
corr(u_i,	X)			=	-0.1220	 	 	 Prob	>	F							=	 0.0000	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Leverage	 Coef.	 Std.	Err.	 z				 	P>z	 [95%	Conf.	 Interval]	
Size	 .0316947	 .0078273	 4.05	 0.000	 .0163409	 .0470486	
Profitability	 -.3919743	 .0469763	 -8.34	 0.000	 -.4841224	 -.2998262	
Growth	 .0039043	 .0079051	 0.49	 0.621	 -.0116024	 .0194109	
Tangibility	 .0995174	 .0234892	 4.24	 0.000	 .0534414	 .1455935	
Fin.Viability	 .0000137	 .0001293	 0.11	 0.916	 -.00024	 .0002673	
NID	 .0152115	 .0050803	 2.99	 0.003	 .005246	 .0251769	
profitNID	 -.2094168	 .0556338	 -3.76	 0.000	 -.3185474	 -.1002863	
_cons	 -.1371707	 .1056365	 -1.30	 0.194	 -.344386	 .0700445	
 
 As we can see from Tables 16 and 17, the major difference seems to be that the P 
value for the coefficient associated with the variable Financial Viability greatly increases. We 
can also see that there are no coefficients whose effect changes in terms of signal (+ or -), so 
the effects remain the same. The only relevant change, in absolute terms, respects the 
interaction term Profitability*NID which decreases from 35% to 21%, but it still remains as a 
very high and significant value. 
  
 We can therefore conclude that results for both groups are robust when handling 
outliers in a different way. 
 
IV.4.2) Limiting time span 
 When limiting the time span, we thought it would be appropriate to use, instead of 11 
years of sample (from 2005 to 2015), a period of only 6 years. Therefore, considering the NID 
implementation in 2012, the period comprised will be from 2009 to 2014. We expect, 
beforehand, that the significance of all coefficients will be reduced due to a decreased set of 
observations for each firm in our sample (for both groups). We also expect that results do not 
change significantly, so that we can attest for the robustness of our study.  
 In conclusion, we present the results of the Final regressions for both groups, for a 6-
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year period, below (in tables 18 and 19). 
 
 
Table 18 - Final Regression (Financials); 2009-2014 
Fixed-effects	(within)	regression		 		Number	of	obs						=								 164	 	
Group	variable:		 CompanyCode			 	Number	of	groups			=								 28	 	
R-sq:		 	within		=			 0.3492	 	Obs	per	group:	 	min	=	 9	
	 between	=		 0.4099	 	 	 avg	=	 10.7	
	 overall	=				 0.3406	 	 	 	max	=	 11	
	 	 	 	 F(4,132)				=						 17.71	 	
corr(u_i,	X)			=	-0.9412	 	 	 Prob	>	F							=	 0.0000	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Leverage	 Coef.	 Std.	Err.	 z				 	P>z	 [95%	Conf.	 Interval]	
Size	 .1435389	 .0265292	 5.41	 0.000	 .0910615	 .1960162	
Profitability	 1.165952	 .357619	 3.26	 0.001	 .4585468	 1.873358	
Tangibility	 .5604186	 .2333023	 2.40	 0.018	 .0989237	 1.021914	
NID	 -.0006448	 .0127038	 -0.05	 0.960	 -.0257742	 .0244846	
_cons	 -1.966991	 .4184426	 -4.70	 0.000	 -2.794712	 -1.13927	
  
 
Table 19 – Final Regression (Non-Financials); 2009-2014 
Fixed-effects	(within)	regression		 		Number	of	obs						=								 984	 	
Group	variable:		 CompanyCode			 	Number	of	groups			=								 169	 	
R-sq:		 	within		=			 0.0962	 	Obs	per	group:	 	min	=	 3	
	 between	=		 0.0384	 	 	 avg	=	 5.8	
	 overall	=				 0.0465	 	 	 	max	=	 6	
	 	 	 	 F(7,808)				=						 12.29	 	
corr(u_i,	X)			=	-0.1655	 	 	 Prob	>	F							=	 0.0000	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Leverage	 Coef.	 Std.	Err.	 z				 	P>z	 [95%	Conf.	 Interval]	
Size	 .0335761	 .0124907	 2.69	 0.007	 .0090579	 .0580942	
Profitability	 -.3202824	 .0868254	 -3.69	 0.000	 -.4907124	 -.1498524	
Growth	 .0009611	 .0140944	 0.07	 0.946	 -.0267048	 .028627	
Tangibility	 .0441882	 .0320683	 1.38	 0.169	 -.0187589	 .1071353	
Fin.Viability	 -.0005356	 .0004597	 -1.17	 0.244	 -.001438	 .0003668	
NID	 .0053219	 .0049992	 1.06	 0.287	 -.0044911	 .0151348	
profitNID	 -.2431274	 .0774416	 -3.14	 0.002	 -.3951379	 -.0911169	
_cons	 -.1366704	 .1681047	 -0.81	 0.416	 -.4666439	 .193303	
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 From the analysis of the two tables above we can again verify that our results indeed 
seem to be robust. However, the P value of our variable of interest (in the case of the 
Financials group) greatly increased. This happened because we greatly reduced the total 
number of observations, for an already small sample group. We can also verify that the sign 
associated to the interaction term profit*NID (in table 19) did not change, and even though its 
absolute value was reduced, it still remained very high (24%). Finally, from tables 18 and 19 
we can even observe that none of the signals associated with the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables changes, when comparing to the Final Regressions for both groups, 
which means that (for the variables that are significantly different from zero) the effects of 


















V – Conclusion & Limitations 
 
 In this final section we will start by presenting the main results we got, relating those 
findings to what we initially expected to evidence. We will also discuss a possible theoretical 
framework that can help explain these results. Finally, we will conclude by presenting the 
main limitations we identified throughout this study and that we believe could have 
influenced our general results. 
  
 First of all, in answer to our first research question, our results allow us to conclude 
that, based on our sample: (i) changes in tax policies do not seem to affect the capital structure 
of Financial firms and (ii) changes in tax policies do affect the capital structure of firms of 
Non-Financial firms. From our Final Regressions we can see that the coefficients associated 
with our variable of interest (i) are not significant for the Financials group and (ii) are 
significant for a significance level of 5% for the Non-Financials group. We believe that, 
possibly, with a larger number of firms included in our Financials group, we could have 
reached statistically significant results for the effect of the NID in Financial firms leverage 
ratios. This way, the answer to our first research question, with a 95% confidence level is, 
based on the Italian case, yes; tax policies do affect the capital structure of Non-Financial 
firms, but not the capital structure of Financial firms. 
 Regarding the second research question, we wanted to verify if the implementation on 
the NID would decrease the leverage ratio of firms. This question can be answered by looking 
at the output of our Final Regressions for both groups: results point out that (i) among 
Financial firms, since we cannot state that the NID impacted their leverage ratios, we 
consequently cannot say that the NID decreased those same leverage ratios. (ii) For the Non-
Financials group, the NID lead to a 2% increase in leverage ratios, but that increase is greatly 
reduced for more profitable firms. Even though we could not prove, as initially intended, that 
the NID reduced the leverage ratio of all Non-Financial firms in our analysis, we could at 
least verify that for profitable firms, the NID did seem to have a less negative impact, which 
is closer to its desired impact. Consequently, one can answer our second research question 
negatively, but with some considerations: no, the NID did not lead to lower leverage ratios, 
among firms in our sample, but it seems that the increases in leverage ratios of Non-
Financials firms were attenuated for more profitable firms. 
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 After conducting Robustness tests, these results we just evidenced seem to remain 
valid when handling outliers in a more “permissive” approach and also when limiting the 
initial time-span of our analysis (11 years) to a shorter period (6years). However, we were 
expecting a wider impact of the NID in reducing leverage ratios. We believe that, despite the 
fact that for more profitable firms (among the Non-Financials group) leverage ratio increases 
were highly softened, we were expecting concrete evidence for the impact of the NID in 
reducing leverage ratios for both the Financials and the Non-Financials group. Hence the 
limitations we will now start to refer: 
 
 First we were only able to conduct our analysis for public firms, since those were the 
firms available in the Worldscope database. Since the NID was designed to be implemented 
and affect all companies, and not just public companies this surely affects our results. When 
compared to private firms, public firms might usually in better conditions to contract debt, 
and seem to get loans under better terms, since there is a lower asymmetry of information 
from the banks’ perspective. This could eventually mean that the NID impact, in lowering 
leverage ratios, for private firms would be more meaningful, which would translate in 
somehow more evident results. Further research could perhaps try to include a sample with 
both public and private firms. 
 Another limitation is that we could only prove the increase in leverage ratios of Non-
Financial firms was softened for more profitable firms. This could have a possible simple 
explanation, related to our final limitation in the following paragraph: profitable firms are the 
ones that do have the ability to fund themselves internally, therefore capitalizing on the 
possible benefits given by the NID. It could be an interesting point for the future, to separate 
the sample into groups based on their level of profitability. 
 Finally, one other limitation for the low impact we verified could be the recession in 
Italy. Our sample comprises a time period which includes the financial crisis of 2008, and as 
we know, its effects lasted for consequent years. Considering more recent years, we can still 
verify the turmoil in the EU economy (2009 Sovereign Debt crisis), which means that after 
the financial crisis of 2008, there were still other negative impacts for businesses resulting 
from the global economy. This may have translated in an impossibility for firms to invest 
their own capital into their respective businesses, which is reflected in an inability to 
capitalize on the NID benefits. The effects of these crisis were not incorporated in our 
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Appendix 1: High number of Impaired Loans in Italy 
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